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Article 8

Probability, Individualization, and
Uniqueness in Forensic Science
Evidence
LISTENING TO THE ACADEMIES

*

David H. Kaye†
INTRODUCTION
These are dark days for the forensic sciences.
Newspaper and magazine articles, op-ed headlines, television
news, and radio talk shows refer to the field as “seriously
deficient,”1 a “dismal science,”2 “in disarray,”3 even “clueless.”4
The stimulus for this negative publicity blitz is a report of a
congressionally-mandated “independent forensic science
committee at the National Academy of Sciences.”5 This belated
report6 calls for structural and cultural changes in the forensic
science community ranging from the separation of laboratories
and police departments, to a uniform, enforceable code of
ethics7 and standardized testimony.8 The report found that:
*
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1
Pete Williams, Crime Labs Are Seriously Deficient, Report Says: National
Academy of Science Says Only DNA Evidence Is Dependable, MSNBC, Feb. 18, 2002,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/29258576/.
2
On Point: Crime Labs and Dismal Science, (Nat’l Public Radio broadcast
Feb. 19, 2009, available at http://www.onpointradio.org/shows/2009/02/dismal-science/.
3
Martha Neil, Crime Labs in Disarray Nationally; Reform, Independence
Needed, Report Says, A.B.A.J. L. NEWS NOW, Feb. 18, 2009, http://abajournal.com/
news/crime_labs_in_disarray_nationally_reform_needed_report_says/.
4
Jennifer L. Mnookin, Op-Ed., Clueless ‘Science’, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2009,
available at http://articles.latimes.com/2009/feb/19/opinion/oe-mnookin19.
5
The National Academies, Project: Identifying the Needs of the Forensic
Science Community, http://www8.nationalacademies.org/cp/projectview.aspx?key=48741
(last visited Mar. 1, 2009).
6
The report originally was scheduled for January 2008. See id. (announcing
a starting date of September 2006 for a project of 16 months duration).
7
NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL COMM. ON IDENTIFYING THE NEEDS OF THE
FORENSIC SCI. CMTY. ET AL., STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED
†
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The forensic science disciplines exhibit wide variability with regard
to techniques, methodologies, reliability, level of error, research,
general acceptability, and published material. . . . Many of the
processes used in the forensic science disciplines are . . . not based on
a body of knowledge that recognizes the underlying limitations of the
scientific principles and methodologies for problem solving and
discovery. . . . [S]ome of these activities [encompassed by the term
“forensic science”] might not have a well developed research base,
are not informed by scientific knowledge, or are not developed within
the culture of science.9

These observations are hardly news to the other
academy—the professoriate. For years, the authors of legal
treatises and journals have complained bitterly about the lack
of regulation of forensic laboratories, the absence of rigorous
proficiency testing, and the dearth of basic research that would
demonstrate the alleged ability of fingerprint, toolmark, and
other analysts to identify traces from one person or object to
the exclusion of all others in the world.10 They have written
dismissively of “nonscience forensic sciences” that “have little
or no basis in actual science,” and they have implored courts to
exclude testimony, pending better research showing that
analysts can live up to their claims.11 With rare exceptions,
however, the courts have failed to perceive the gap between

STATES: A PATH FORWARD 26 (2009) [hereinafter NRC 2009], available at
http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=12589&page=R1.
8
Id. at 21 (“The terminology used in reporting and testifying about the
results of forensic science investigations must be standardized.”).
9
Id. at 38-39.
10
A small sample of this literature includes D.H. KAYE ET AL., THE NEW
WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON EVIDENCE: EXPERT EVIDENCE (2004); MODERN SCIENTIFIC
EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY (David Faigman et al. eds.,
2008-2009 edition); Simon A. Cole, Is Fingerprint Identification Valid? Rhetorics of
Reliability in Fingerprint Proponents’ Discourse, 28 L. & POL’Y 109 (2006); Craig M.
Cooley, Reforming the Forensic Community to Avert the Ultimate Injustice, 15 STAN. L.
& POL’Y REV. 381 (2004); Paul C. Giannelli, Wrongful Convictions and Forensic Science:
The Need to Regulate Crime Labs, 86 N.C. L. REV. 163 (2007); Jennifer L. Mnookin, The
Validity of Latent Fingerprint Identification: Confessions of a Fingerprinting Moderate,
7 L., PROBABILITY & RISK 127, 127 (2008); Michael J. Saks & Jonathan J. Koehler, The
Coming Paradigm Shift in Forensic Identification Science, 309 SCIENCE 892 (2005).
11
E.g., Simon A. Cole, Does “Yes” Really Mean Yes? The Attempt to Close
Debate on the Admissibility of Fingerprint Testimony, 45 JURIMETRICS J. 449 (2005);
Lyn Haber & Ralph Norman Haber, Experiential or Scientific Expertise, 7 L.,
PROBABILITY & RISK 143 (2008); D. Michael Risinger & Michael J. Saks, Science and
Nonscience in the Courts: Daubert Meets Handwriting Identification Expertise, 82 IOWA
L. REV. 21 (1996); Adina Schwartz, A Systemic Challenge to the Reliability and
Admissibility of Firearms and Toolmark Identification, 6 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV.
1, 1 (2005) (“[A]ll firearms and toolmark identifications should be excluded until
adequate statistical empirical foundations and proficiency testing are developed for the
field.”).
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optimistic theory and hard proof, and they have accepted
remarkably weak forms of validation.12
With the imprimatur of the National Academy of
Sciences behind recommendations for major change, the need
for forensic scientists or analysts to retreat from the most
extreme claims finally should be apparent to the judiciary as
well as the forensic science community. But how far should this
retreat go? Should forensic scientists be forever barred from
giving an opinion that a DNA sample, a fingerprint, or a
broken part of an object originated from a particular person,
finger, or matching object? What does it take to justify such
opinions? This essay seeks to clarify these questions by
scrutinizing several statements and recommendations on how
to present testimony offered in an essay by two of the legal
academy’s foremost critics of contemporary forensic science. In
The Individualization Fallacy in Forensic Science (“Fallacy”),13
Professors Michael Saks and Jay Koehler make the following
statements:
(1) The concept of “individualization,” which lies at the core of
numerous forensic science subfields, exists only in a metaphysical or
rhetorical sense. It has no scientific validity, and it is sustained
largely by the faulty logic that equates infrequency with
uniqueness.14
(2) [A]pplication of the product rule necessarily falls short of
establishing unique individualization. The product of probabilities
greater than zero always yields a value greater than zero. The
probabilistic approach, therefore, always leads to the conclusion that
a source other than the suspected individual or object might exist.15
(3) The claim of unique individuality cannot be proven with
samples . . . . “It is impossible to prove any human characteristic to
be distinct in each individual without checking every
individual . . . .” Anything less results in probability statements
rather than conclusions of absolute specificity and absolute
identification.16

12

See, e.g., D.H. KAYE ET AL., supra note 10; 4 MODERN SCIENTIFIC
EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY, supra note 10, at 276-77;
Mnookin, supra note 10, at 127-29.
13
Michael J. Saks & Jonathan J. Koehler, The Individualization Fallacy in
Forensic Science Evidence, 61 VAND. L. REV. 199 (2008).
14
Id. at 205.
15
Id. at 209 (footnote omitted).
16
Id. at 211 (footnote omitted). After asserting that sampling is incapable of
proving uniqueness, the first sentence adds that this is “especially” so for “samples that
are a tiny proportion of the relevant population.” Id.
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(4) [A]s Karl Popper famously explained, it is logically impossible to
prove a hypothesis by accumulating positive instances. The
hypothesis, “all swans are white,” remains unproven, even after a
large number of sightings of white swans, because the sighting of a
single black swan would disprove it. Similarly, the hypothesis that
no two objects are indistinguishably alike cannot be proven true
from an accumulation of observations in which different object
sources produce distinctive markings.17
(5) Even a very large number of pairwise, case-by-case comparisons
made by individual examiners would not provide a satisfactory
method for testing the object uniqueness claim.18

Although I agree with the critique of a great deal of
forensic science testimony, to the extent that these statements
imply that, even in principle, science cannot establish the
uniqueness of objects, I am dubious. In addition,
individualization—the conclusion that “this trace came from
this individual or this object”—is not the same as, and need not
depend on, the belief in universal uniqueness.19 Consequently,
there are circumstances in which an analyst reasonably can
testify to having determined the source of an object, whether or
not uniqueness is demonstrable. Part I of this essay shows why
the arguments for radical skepticism of uniqueness are not
convincing. Part II explains the distinction between
individualization and uniqueness. It explicates what I believe
to be the real individualization fallacy—the putatively sharp
dichotomy between class and individual characteristics. Part
III applies these ideas to courtroom testimony and argues that
a variety of courtroom explanations of the meaning of a match
should be permissible.
I.

PROVING UNIQUENESS

A.

Metaphysics

If all that a criminalist can say is that, in some
untestable ways, no two objects are the same, then the
testimony should be excluded as irrelevant and as not
constituting specialized “knowledge” within the meaning of
17

Id. at 212 (footnotes omitted).
Id.
19
On a more restricted meaning of “individualization” in forensic science, see,
for example, John I. Thornton & Joseph L. Peterson, The General Assumptions and
Rationale of Forensic Identification, in 4 MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND
SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY, supra note 10, at 1, 11.
18
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Rule 702 of the Federal or Uniform Rules of Evidence.20
Courtroom claims of individuality, however, necessarily have to
do with measurable characteristics that can exhibit
unequivocal differences and similarities.21 For example, in
1992, a committee of the National Academy of Sciences (the
“NAS”) recommended that “[c]ourts should take judicial notice
of [the] scientific underpinnings of DNA typing”—including the
fact that “[e]ach person’s DNA is unique (except that of
identical twins) . . . .”22 Although we lack the technology to
generate error-free sequences of the more than six billion base
pairs that constitute diploid human genomes, in principle, the
claim of individuality can be refuted by a much improved
sequencing experiment that establishes perfect congruence in
two
individual
genomes.
The
NAS
committee’s
individualization hypothesis—which is standard fare in human
genetics—could be wrong, but it is not metaphysical.23
B.

The Product Rule and Nonzero Probabilities

Saks and Koehler’s second point is that uniqueness is
beyond the realm of proof because “[t]he product of
probabilities greater than zero always yields a value greater
than zero. The probabilistic approach, therefore, always leads
to the conclusion that a source other than the suspected
individual or object might exist.”24
This argument proves too much. If the problem is
simply that another source might exist, then the fallacy infects
all scientific research and testimony. There is always some
nonzero probability of an erroneous conclusion. Ohm’s law
20

Cf. D.H. Kaye, On “Falsification” and “Falsifiability”: The First Daubert
Factor and the Philosophy of Science, 45 JURIMETRICS J. 473 (2005) (discussing the
importance and meaning of falsifiability for scientific knowledge).
21
See, e.g., Michael G. Koot et al., Radiographic Human Identification Using
Bones of the Hand: A Validation Study, 50 J. FORENSIC SCI. 263, 263-64 (2005)
(suggesting that “skeletal features formed in late childhood remain unique throughout
life” on the basis, in part, of a previous analysis of 40 pairs of hand radiographs of
same-sex, identical twins for which “there were, in every instance, some features which
made it possible to distinguish the hand and wrist bones of one person from those of his
or her own twin”). This limited study falls woefully short of demonstrating uniqueness,
but the logic of looking at identical twins for differences is sound.
22
NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL COMM. ON DNA TECH. IN FORENSIC SCI., DNA
TECHNOLOGY IN FORENSIC SCIENCE 23 (1992) [hereinafter NRC 1992].
23
In describing certain claims of uniqueness as “not metaphysical,” I am
responding to “the impression that metaphysics is a study that somehow ‘goes beyond’
physics.” Peter van Inwagen, Metaphysics, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHILOSOPHY (2007), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/metaphysics/.
24
Saks & Koehler, supra note 13, at 209.
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might not be exactly right, or it might break down tomorrow,
but electrical engineers can safely assume that it is absolutely
true.25 Returning to forensic science, was it fallacious for the
1992 NAS committee to represent that an individual’s full
genome is unique? A researcher applying standard statistical
reasoning would reject the hypothesis of duplication vis-à-vis
the alternative hypothesis of uniqueness when the probability
of duplication in the population is small enough. A second NAS
committee suggested that “[w]ith an increasing number of loci
available for forensic analysis, we are approaching the time
when each person’s profile will be unique (except for identical
twins and other close relatives).”26 Its 1996 report distinguished
between specific and general claims of uniqueness. A specific
profile might be unique: “Suppose that, in a population of N
unrelated persons, a given DNA profile has probability P. The
probability (before a suspect has been profiled) that the
particular profile observed in the evidence sample is not unique
is at most NP.”27 A small probability NP indicates that the one
profile under consideration is likely to be unique within a
population that contains as many as N unrelated people. This
is uniqueness conditioned on a given genotype.
General uniqueness refers to all the profiles in the
population. “A lower bound on the probability that every person
is unique depends on the population size, the number of loci,
and the heterozygosity of the individual loci.”28 With some
simplifying assumptions, the probability of this event also can
be estimated. “Neglecting population structure and close
relatives, 10 loci with a geometric mean heterozygosity of 95%
25

In their rejoinder in this issue of the Law Review, Professors Koehler and
Saks question whether Ohm’s law (as opposed to say, the subsequent example of the
laws of electromagnetism) is a good illustration of the common practice of expressing
textbook knowledge as established scientific fact. Jonathan J. Koehler & Michael J.
Saks, Individualization Claims in Forensic Science: Still Unwarranted, 75 BROOK. L.
REV. 1187, 1203-04 (2010). They are correct in criticizing this first example. More
dubious, however, is their insistence that “[t]he implication is that even if forensic
examiners can’t be 100% sure of their ability to individualize, they are safe in
proceeding on the assumption that their individualization conclusions are absolutely
true.” Id. at 1203. Whether it is safe to accept any scientific statement obviously
depends on its foundation. See infra note 45. As the next sentence in the text and the
larger discussion plainly indicate, the only implication of these examples is that, in
appropriate circumstances, statements of uniqueness (such as the textbook claims
about human genomes) could be accepted as true despite a nonzero probability that
they are false.
26
NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL COMM. ON DNA FORENSIC SCI., AN UPDATE, THE
EVALUATION OF DNA EVIDENCE 161 (1996) [hereinafter NRC 1996].
27
Id.
28
Id.
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give a probability greater than about 0.999 that no two
unrelated people in the world have the same profile.”29
For Saks and Koehler, however, no probability of
duplication is small enough to warrant an opinion that DNA or
anything else is unique. Thus, they reject the reasoning that a
“probability of two individuals having the same fingerprint is
60
one out of 1 × 10 . . . is so small as to exclude the possibility of
any two individuals having the same fingerprints.”30 They are
correct, but only in the trivial sense that every event with a
–60
nonzero probability is a “possibility.” P = 10 is supposed to be
the probability that two randomly selected people will have
matching fingerprints. Although I doubt the accuracy of the
estimated match probability,31 the allegedly “faulty logic”32—the
–60
move from P = 10 for the probability of a match to a randomly
selected pair to zero for the probability of a match for all
possible pairs—is defensible. Suppose that the world’s
population (N) is seven billion. The number of distinct pairs of
19
people is N(N – 1)/2, which is on the order of 10 . Even for this
–60
many comparisons, when each has only a probability of 10 of
being the same, the chance of one or more identical fingerprints
–41
in the world’s population is about 10 .33 Technically, this
29

Id. The computation, “an application of the ‘birthday problem’ with
unequal probabilities,” can be found in appendix 5C of the report. More STR loci (the
type currently used in DNA identification) would be required to achieve the same
probability of uniqueness. See id. at 165; see also KAYE ET AL., supra note 10, § 12.5.3.
30
Saks & Koehler, supra note 13, at 203 (quoting RICHARD SAFERSTEIN,
CRIMINALISTICS: AN INTRODUCTION TO FORENSIC SCIENCE 73 (9th ed. 2007)).
31
If we truly could believe that the chance of the fingerprints of any two
–60
different people matching were 10 , we could—and should—believe in the uniqueness
of fingerprints. Whether fingerprint examiners reliably can differentiate latent prints
–60
at the level of detail needed to give rise to probabilities such as 10 is obviously
another story (and not a very believable one). See generally David H. Kaye, From
Snowflakes to Fingerprints: A Dubious Courtroom Proof of the Uniqueness of
Fingerprints, 71 INT’L STAT. REV. 521, 524 (2003) (criticizing an unpublished study by
an FBI contractor introduced by the Department of Justice and relied on by federal
courts to show “that the probability of finding two people with identical fingerprints
was one in ten to the ninety-seventh power [and] that the probability of finding two
different, partial fingerprints to be identical was one in ten to the twenty-seventh
power.”); see also Christophe Champod, Fingerprint Examination: Towards More
Transparency, 7 L., PROBABILITY & RISK 111, 113 (2008) (“Systematic research on the
selectivity of fingerprint features [indicates] that even very limited configurations of
fingerprint minutiae can provide . . . match probabilities on the order of 1 in a billion,
even without considering the statistical contribution of level 1 features (general
pattern, ridge counts, etc.) or other fingerprint features if available.”).
32
Saks & Koehler, supra note 13, at 204.
33
Intuitively, if each comparison has the same tiny probability P of producing
a match and we have made n comparisons, then the probability of at least one match is
close to nP. See Frederick Mosteller, Understanding the Birthday Problem, 55 MATH.
TEACHER 322 (1962) (eqn. 7), reprinted in SELECTED PAPERS OF FREDERICK MOSTELLER
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probability is greater than zero, but that mathematical truism
hardly makes it fallacious to exclude as totally unrealistic the
thought of a matching fingerprint from someone else. It is not a
fallacy to infer uniqueness (both specific and general) when the
match probability P is immensely smaller than the reciprocal of
the size of a population of objects, every one of whose members
has the small probability P of matching.34
Thus, the problem with using probability theory to
demonstrate uniqueness is not that the probability of
duplication always exceeds zero. The difference might be too
small to matter. Such demonstrations are generally
unconvincing because it is so hard to establish that the models
are sufficiently realistic and accurate to trust the computed
probabilities. But sometimes probabilities are negligible. Just
think about the chance that you would suffocate because all the
nearby molecules of oxygen in the room would happen to move
to the other half of the room. A few simple assumptions and a
bit of statistical mechanics demonstrate that the possibility
need not worry us.
C.

Direct Testing (Sampling)

Saks and Koehler’s remaining arguments (3 through 5)
boil down to the claim that sample data cannot establish the
exact proportion of an entire population that shares a given
characteristic. Uniqueness means that the proportion of objects
with the given feature in the whole population of size N is
exactly 1/N. Yet, no matter how close the sample proportion
comes to 1/N, the next sample datum could establish that the
population proportion is 2/N or more.
Again, this is true but not indicative of faulty reasoning.
Certainly, there are reasons to distrust the “it hasn’t happened
yet” theory of uniqueness. Fallacy cogently explains the
limitations
of
unsystematic,
“pairwise,
case-by-case
comparisons made by individual examiners,”35 and it points to
19

349, 351 (Stephen E. Fienberg & David Caster Hoaglin eds., 2006). For n = 10 and P =
–60
–41
10 , this gives 10 . (A more precise calculation gives a value with the same order of
magnitude.) Since the probability of the world’s population having distinct fingerprints
–41
differs from 1 by a mere 10 , for all practical (and impractical) purposes, fingerprints
are globally unique—that is, if people are assigned fingerprint patterns by a process
60
that is equivalent to randomly sampling an infinite population in which the 10
distinct patterns are uniformly distributed.
34
See DAVID J. BALDING, WEIGHT-OF-EVIDENCE FOR FORENSIC DNA PROFILES
148 (2005).
35
Id.
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contradictory reports of matches in trace evidence coming from
different individuals.36 These are reasons enough for
skepticism, but the white swans and the insistence that only a
census will do the job makes it look as if the examiners are
pursuing a line of proof that is logically incapable of supporting
the desired inference. The flaw is not with the logic. It is with
the data.37 The number of comparisons required to prove
uniqueness by brute empirical force (that is, to make the
normal statistical inference from a sample to a population) is
surprisingly larger than one might think.38 It takes a randommatch probability whose reciprocal is orders of magnitude
larger than the population of objects to make uniqueness
almost certain.39
But this difficulty with a direct empirical proof is not
tantamount to Popper’s realization that universal laws cannot
be proved to a logical certainty by simple induction.40 Modern
science is full of universal laws. The laws of electromagnetism,
for instance, remain unproven and unprovable in Popper’s
logical sense.41 The only universal propositions that can be
proven to a certainty are deductively valid ones, such as the
theorem that all whole numbers that end in an even digit are
divisible by two. No experimentation is required to test this
law. In contrast, no matter how many times scientists observe
that a change in the magnetic flux in a coil or wire induces a
voltage, they cannot be certain that it will happen the next
time. In principle, a single experiment with no change in
voltage would disprove Faraday’s Law.42
In Popper’s framework, the repeated failure of forensic
examiners to find “two sets of markings produced by different

36

Id. at 213.
Fallacy can be read this way as well. See id. (“As the size of a comparison
database becomes larger, the object uniqueness hypothesis is subjected to an
increasingly tough empirical test. If, under these circumstances, scientists still do not
find indistinguishably similar matches produced by different objects, then object
uniqueness becomes a more credible theory.”).
38
Id. at 203-04 (describing a version of the “birthday problem” in probability
theory).
39
Id. at 148.
40
Saks & Koehler, supra note 13, at 212.
41
See id.
42
Id. In practice, a single experiment would not suffice. Effects that cannot
be replicated are likely to be the result of experimental error. Because data gathering
is fallible, a single sighting of a black swan might not be enough to disprove the
hypothesis that all swans are white. The observer might have been mistaken about the
bird (it was not really a swan) or its true color (it had flown through a cloud of soot).
37
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sources that are indistinguishable from each other”43 lends
some support to the generalization that all different sources
produce distinguishable markings. His swan example merely
shows that we never can be absolutely certain of any
generalization. If that is all that the individualization fallacy
consists of, then all induction is fallacious. “[T]he faulty logic
that equates infrequency with uniqueness” is not a logical
fallacy.44
The threshold issue for the law, therefore, is not the
impossibility of falsifying universal propositions. It is whether
criminalists are warranted in believing, as a practical matter,
that certain universals (everyone has different fingerprints,
everyone other than identical twins have different genomes,
every face is unique, and so on) are true.45 If these beliefs are
warranted, and if criminalists can measure the features that
give rise to these differences with sufficient accuracy, then
their claims to be able to individualize are sound. If these
beliefs outstrip available theory and knowledge, as Saks and
Koehler claim and as the NAS committee agrees (except, it

43

Id.
Id. at 205. A fallacy in logic is a faulty form of reasoning, not merely a
conclusion that might be faulty. In a system of inductive logic, there is no formal fallacy
in generalizing from repeated observations. Sample data permit inferences about
population parameters—including the parameter that a characteristic occurs only once
in the population. Naturally, there is a nonzero risk of error in accepting any inference
about any population parameter. “The gap between the sample and the population will
always require a leap of faith.” PHILLIP I. GOOD & JAMES W. HARDIN, COMMON ERRORS
IN STATISTICS (AND HOW TO AVOID THEM) 74 (2003). The only issue worth debating is
the length of the leap.
45
Koehler and Saks read this sentence and personal correspondence not
intended for publication as indicating that I use the words “establish the truth” to
mean, in their words, “something . . . akin to a strong personal belief that has a solid
foundation in data.” Koehler & Saks, supra note 25, at 1196 n.35. In contrast, they
define “establish the truth” to mean “that all point predictions other than the target
prediction have been ruled out by the data,” and they “simply do not accept [my]
weakened definitional form of ‘establish the truth.’” Id. This characterization prompts a
brief clarification. Clearly, the warrant for a scientific belief or statement is not the
strength of the conviction of the scientist who holds it. Neither does the warrant lie in
vague allusions to “training and experience.” Id. at 1197. Rather the question is
whether the proposition has a secure foundation in data and theory. For most (and
arguably all) forensic identification techniques, this foundation for strong claims of
global uniqueness is missing. However, I do not embrace the rigid “definitional” view
that a census is required to establish the likely truth (and what other kind of truth is
there in science?) with respect to “all point predictions other than the target
prediction.” Id. at 1196 n.35. For example, if the probability of duplication really were
41
as small as 10− , see supra note 33, then the competing hypotheses effectively would
have been ruled out, and the belief in the “target prediction” would be warranted.
44
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seems, for DNA evidence),46 then the beliefs are either
premature or false.
II.

INDIVIDUALIZATION WITHOUT UNIQUENESS

Part I distinguished between claims of general
uniqueness (no two pairs anywhere match) and specific
uniqueness (no other object matches the particular trace seen
in the case at bar). I argued that although general uniqueness
is much more difficult to establish, an inductive proof of it is
not beyond the capacity of science.47
That said, the fact that general uniqueness is so hard to
prove makes the traditional reasoning of many forensicidentification practitioners suspect, if not dogmatic. Rather
than conduct the difficult empirical research that would be
needed to establish that these objects or impressions are all
uniquely identifiable, they postulate general uniqueness and
use it to infer that a match then proves that a hair, a fiber, or
the mark must have originated from the source that it
matches. In the absence of proof of the premise of general
uniqueness, however, this reasoning is insecure and might well
be denominated an individualization fallacy.
Furthermore, the widely used distinction between
“class” and “individual” characteristics48 encourages this
individualization fallacy. The theory is that a large number of
objects share class characteristics (such as shoe size), while
other features (such as the scratches on the sole of a shoe) are
individual characteristics. This definitional system promotes
such tautologies as “[t]he uniqueness of an object may be
established by an ensemble of individual [as opposed to class]
characteristics.”49 Blithely postulating uniqueness in this
manner, forensic science textbooks contain advice such as the
following: “A positive identification is a conclusion that a
46

NRC 2009, supra note 7, at 87 (“[N]o forensic method other than nuclear
DNA analysis has been rigorously shown to have the capacity to consistently and with
a high degree of certainty support conclusions about ‘individualization’ . . . .”).
47
Additional analysis of conceptions of uniqueness and their relationship to
individualization can be found in David H. Kaye, Identification, Individualization, and
Uniqueness: What’s the Difference?, 8 L., PROBABILITY & RISK 85 (2009) (distinguishing
between “universal individualization” and “local individualization,” between “general
uniqueness” and “special uniqueness,” and between “universal uniqueness” and “local
uniqueness”).
48
See, e.g., Thornton & Peterson, supra note 19, § 29:7, at 8 (describing the
distinction and its use in the process of comparison).
49
Id.
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particular shoe, and no other shoe, made the crime scene
impression. No minimum number of individual identifying
characteristics is needed to establish a positive identification.”50
It would be better to eschew the class-individual distinction in
favor of the realization that all characteristics are class ones.
What matters is the size of the class. Some features are more
discriminating than others. Shoe size, for example, is known to
be shared by many objects. It can be extremely valuable and
easily used in excluding a given individual or object from
further investigation.51 (If the shoe does not fit, you must
acquit.) It also has rather modest probative value in showing
that a specific individual or object is the source of the trace
evidence. (Even if the shoe fits, you need not convict.) Other
characteristics are far more variable. These supposedly
“individual” characteristics pertain to a much smaller class (a
class of one in the limit). As such, they have much greater
probative value in establishing an association between two
items than do the “class” characteristics that define a larger
class.52
But even if the traditional class-individual distinction
begs the question of global uniqueness, a scientifically
defensible opinion as to individualization is still attainable in
some situations.53 This is the case for two reasons. First,
testimony that a particular item is unique is a much weaker
claim than testimony that all items are unique. Second,
contrary to the loose or elliptical statements of many forensic
scientists,54 individualization does not presuppose or imply even
conditional uniqueness in a finite set. Suppose that a man
suspected of stealing a jewel on a cruise ship has a fingerprint
pattern that matches the latent print on the drawer from
which the jewel was stolen and that there were 2500 people on
board the ship at the time. Two thousand of them are
fingerprinted, and only one is found to match. The other 500
people cannot be located. If the quality of the prints is high, the
probability of a match to any of the 500 missing people could be
50

William J. Bodziak, Forensic Footwear Evidence, in FORENSIC SCIENCE: AN
INTRODUCTION TO SCIENTIFIC AND INVESTIGATIVE TECHNIQUES 297, 309 (Stuart H.
James & Jon J. Nordby eds., 2003); see also id. at 298.
51
See e.g., Thornton & Peterson, supra note 19, § 29:7, at 8.
52
This perspective is congruent with Saks and Koehler’s emphasis on
probability statements. See Saks & Koehler, supra note 13, at 211.
53
For a more detailed discussion, see generally Kaye, supra note 47.
54
E.g., Thornton & Peterson, supra note 19, § 29:10, at 11 (“Individualization
implies uniqueness.”).
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miniscule. It then would be reasonable to conclude that the
fingerprint examiner has identified the one individual who left
the print. This is an individualization even though it does not
imply that no one else on the earth has the same prints.55
It might be thought that the cruise-ship example is
contrived, but the point is more general. Following the
invitation of the 1996 NRC report, FBI examiners, focusing on
conditional uniqueness, have testified to source identifications
in cases for which they consider the duplication probability for
a particular profile in the United States population to be quite
small.56 The 2009 report also seems comfortable with such
testimony.57 Yet, the Saks-and-Koehler argument that any
nonzero probability makes an assertion fallacious applies to
DNA,58 and Fallacy brands an opinion that a defendant is the
source of a DNA sample as “an evasion” of science.59
55

Cf. IAN W. EVETT & BRUCE S. WEIR, INTERPRETING DNA EVIDENCE:
STATISTICAL GENETICS FOR FORENSIC SCIENTISTS 239 (1998) (“The issue for the
forensic scientist is not ‘Is this profile unique’ . . . but ‘Is there sufficient evidence to
demonstrate that they originate from the identical source.’”). Koehler and Saks object
to using the word “individualization” to denote such testimony. They write that
The definition that Professor Kaye relies on reduces individualization to a
subjective belief that is bolstered by evidence that falls far short of sufficient
proof for this extreme claim. The difference between individualization as it is
commonly understood and the definition offered by Professor Kaye is the
difference between claiming that Alberto is the tallest man in the world
because his measured height is greater than every other person in the world,
and claiming that Alberto is the tallest man in the world either because an
insufficiently tested theory assumes he is or because we have not seen
anyone taller among those we have looked at.
Koehler & Saks, supra note 25, at 1201. This seems exactly backwards. Most critics
maintain that it is the current definition of “individualization”—the “commonly
understood” one described by Koehler and Saks—that produces testimony of
identification based on subjective determinations that lack rigorous support. Relying
on “subjective belief” and studies that fall “far short” is not a consequence of defining
“an individualization” as a determination that one and only one individual is the source
of the trace evidence in the case at bar. Similarly, this easily understood definition does
not commit one to unsubstantiated claims about Alberto’s height or to “personal
feelings or hunches.” Id. Neither Professors Koehler and Saks nor the last generation
of forensic scientists can, by definitional fiat, confine the words “individualize” or
“identify” to assertions based on the postulate of global uniqueness.
56
Roberto Suro, DNA Now Used to Make Specific Identification; FBI Calls
Lab Match “Major Breakthrough”, WASH. POST, Nov. 13, 1997, at A4. Courts have
upheld these source attributions despite defense arguments that untested relatives
might match or that the laboratory could have erred. United States v. Davis, 602 F.
Supp. 2d 658, 683-85 (D. Md. 2009); Young v. State, 879 A.2d 44, 56 (Md. 2005).
57
See supra note 46.
58
They also describe a different fallacy with regard to DNA evidence,
exemplified by the prosecutor’s closing argument in People v. Simpson that if the
random-match probability is one in 57 billion, the population must exceed 57 billion for
a duplicate to exist. Saks & Koehler, supra note 13, at 203. As they cogently explain,
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In sum, a well founded and extremely tiny randommatch probability indicates that, even if some other pairs of
objects do match, the match at issue is not merely a
coincidence; rather, it is a true association to a single source.60
In appropriate cases, therefore, it is ethical and scientifically
sound for an expert witness to offer an opinion as to the source
of the trace evidence. Of course, it would be more precise to
present the random-match probability instead of the
qualitative statement, but scientists speak of many
propositions that are merely highly likely as if they have been
proved. They are practicing rather than evading science when
they round off in this fashion.
This is not to say that such testimony is the best method
of communicating the test results to a lay jury. There is a
cogent argument that such opinions are not helpful when more
precise indications of probative value are available to permit
the jury to reach its own conclusion about the source of the
trace evidence.61 At this point, however, we are moving from
what is scientifically acceptable to what is legally optimal. This
the mere fact that the expected number of individuals on Earth with a specific DNA
type is less than the world’s population does not mean that there can be no duplication.
Id. At some point, however, the probability of duplication becomes so small that it is
fair to dismiss this hypothesis as implausible. Id. Existing random-match probabilities
for DNA evidence may have reached the point where an expert can opine that a profile
is unique to an individual (and any identical twins). See, e.g., People v. Nelson, 185
P.3d 49, 52 (Cal. 2008) (“The prosecution presented evidence that the odds that a
random person unrelated to defendant . . . could have fit the profile of some of the
crime scene evidence are one in 930 sextillion (93 followed by 22 zeros).”); State v.
Bloom, 516 N.W.2d 159, 160 n.2 (Minn. 1994) (“Dr. [Daniel] Hartl, if permitted, would
further testify at trial that in fact there was a nine-loci match and that in his opinion
the nine-loci match constituted ‘overwhelming evidence that, to a reasonable degree of
scientific certainty, the DNA from the victim’s vaginal swab came from [defendant], to
the exclusion of all others.’”). However, one should take all the zeroes in the estimates
like those in Nelson with a proverbial grain of salt. See, e.g., Peter J. Bickel, Discussion
of “The Evaluation of Forensic DNA Evidence”, 94 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 5497 (1997)
(“[M]any scientists would not agree that the modeling assumptions . . . can be verified
to hold so precisely that the match probabilities can be ascertained to an order of 1 in
one billion.”).
59
Saks & Koehler, supra note 13, at 218 n.94. In doing so, they part company
with the statistician whose exposition of “the uniqueness fallacy” motivates their
putative fallacy. See BALDING, supra note 34, at 148 (describing as “reasonable” the
judgment that a characteristic is unique when it is “several orders of magnitude
smaller” than the random match probability).
60
This inference assumes that other hypotheses (handling error, fraud, etc.)
also have been eliminated. See KAYE ET AL., supra note 10, § 12.3.1.
61
See, e.g., EVETT & WEIR, supra note 55, at 241 (“Once we assign a
[probability] then we must recognize that we have given the court something that they
may choose to work with or without our assistance. Certainly, the idea that the
scientist has some particular power to take that number and take a step equivalent to
the Stoney ‘leap of faith’ is misconceived.”).
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argument should be addressed on its merits and not foreclosed
as an unscientific option.
III.

PRESENTING LIMITED KNOWLEDGE IN COURT

The NAS committee recommends that “[f]orensic
reports, and any courtroom testimony stemming from them,
must include clear characterizations of the limitations of the
analyses, including measures of uncertainty in reported results
and associated estimated probabilities where possible.”62 Saks
and Koehler likewise implore criminalists to present “humbler,
scientifically justifiable, and probabilistic conclusions.”63 But
neither group presents any serious analysis of whether
numerical presentations are preferable to arguably more
comprehensible qualitative ones, and what to do when
probabilities are not at hand is open to debate. Inasmuch as
there is a growing literature on these matters, I shall content
myself with commenting on a few specifics, mentioning a
variety of approaches, and pleading for eclecticism.
A.

“Consistent-with” Testimony

Fallacy calls on criminalists who report that two
samples are “a match” or “consistent” to add that this “does not
require a conclusion that the patterns share a common
source.”64 To hammer home the point that other people or
objects might match, Fallacy asks the witnesses to state that
“in finding that two patterns match, they have placed the
suspect object or person in a pool of one or more objects that
match the evidentiary marks.”65 The take-home message would
be, “we have a match, but we cannot say how many other
people or things would match.”
This “appropriate clarity and restraint” seems
comparable to the weak presentation recommended by an NAS
committee that reviewed the foundations for testimony about
62

NRC 2009, supra note 7, at 21-22.
Saks & Koehler, supra note 13, at 219.
64
Id. at 216; cf. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL COMM. ON SCIENTIFIC
ASSESSMENT OF BULLET LEAD ELEMENTAL COMPOSITION COMPARISON, FORENSIC
ANALYSIS: WEIGHING BULLET LEAD EVIDENCE 110 (2004) [hereinafter NRC 2004] (“The
conclusions in laboratory reports should be expanded to include the limitations of
compositional analysis of bullet lead evidence. In particular, a further explanatory
comment should accompany the laboratory conclusions to readily portray the
limitations of the evidence.”).
65
Saks & Koehler, supra note 13, at 216 (emphasis added).
63
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the concentrations of various elements in bullet lead.66 The
committee’s findings brought to a halt this use of analytical
chemistry to associate bullet fragments with boxes of
ammunition.67 The committee had proposed limiting the
formerly exuberant statements of analysts to
testimony
that bullets
from the
same compositionally
indistinguishable volume of lead (CIVL) are more likely to be
analytically indistinguishable than bullets from different CIVLs. An
examiner may also testify that having . . . evidence that two bullets
are analytically indistinguishable increases the probability that two
bullets come from the same CIVL, versus no evidence of match
status.68

In colloquial terms, the committee recommended testimony to
the effect that it is more likely to find a match when bullets
come from the same blob of molten lead than when they come
from different blobs. Such statements might reasonably be
made with respect to other forms of trace evidence. A cautious
analyst could report that similarities in head hairs are more
likely when the hairs come from the same scalp than when
they come from different scalps.69

66

See NRC 2004, supra note 64.
Press Release, FBI Nat’l Press Office, FBI Laboratory Announces
Discontinuation of Bullet Lead Examinations (Sept. 1, 2005), available at
http://www.fbi.gov/pressrel/pressrel05/bullet_lead_analysis.htm (last visited Mar. 2,
2009).
68
NRC 2004, supra note 64, at 112.
69
In statistical jargon, this is a statement that the likelihood ratio or Bayes’
factor for the evidence exceeds one. See KAYE ET AL., supra note 10, §§ 12.4.2, 12.4.3.
The 2009 NRC report implicitly endorses the use of more sharply defined likelihood
ratios, at least for written reports. The report states that:
67

Although some disciplines have developed vocabulary and scales to be used in
reporting results, they have not become standard practice. This imprecision
in vocabulary stems in part from the paucity of research in forensic science
and the corresponding limitations in interpreting the results of forensic
analyses. Publications such as Evett et al., Aitken and Taroni, and Evett
provide the essential building blocks for the proper assessment and
communication of forensic findings.
NRC 2009, supra note 7, at 186 (citations omitted). The three authorities cited propose
verbal scales for characterizing likelihood ratios. Two of them offer the following table
for “reporting the value of the support of the evidence” (where V is the applicable
likelihood ratio):
1 < V ≤ 10
10 < V ≤ 100
100 < V ≤ 1000
1000 < V ≤ 10000
10000 < V

Limited evidence to support
Moderate evidence to support
Moderately strong evidence to support
Strong evidence to support
Very strong evidence to support
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Neither of these approaches—the one-or-more-out-there
statement nor the makes-it-more-likely assertion—clarifies
how probative the evidence is. With bullet-lead comparisons,
the jury might well be unduly impressed even with the modest
statements of the results of inductively coupled plasma optical
emission spectroscopy, which is the technique that gives the
concentrations of the elements. This danger seems less when it
comes to more mundane matters like the visual appearance of
toolmarks and hairs. Thus, even though there is some risk of
prejudice, this risk seems worth running with most forms of
trace evidence, at least when compared with the alternative of
entirely depriving the jury of a fair description of a relevant
scientific finding.70
The proposals to scale back forensic science testimony
reflect the view that an expert testifies not as an advocate, but
as the representative of a learned profession, conveying its
knowledge, along with its limitations, to the jury. A neutral
expert not seeking to overawe the jury would express the
important limitations up front. This is an attractive ideal but
difficult to realize in practice. Attorneys often urge expert
witnesses to suppress all qualifications and reservations—the
joke about the desirability of the “one-handed economist,” the
one who won’t say “on the other hand . . . ,” comes to mind.71
Whether criminalists can stake out and preserve the
independence to use both hands is far from obvious. Perhaps
the NAS recommendation for an enforceable code of ethics
would provide the requisite backbone. Although I am not sure
that the law needs to require the expert to express every caveat
in direct examination, much would be gained if the legal
system or the forensic science profession insisted on written
laboratory reports containing all the cautions. An analyst who
holds these back on direct examination should be easy to
impeach with his or her own report. In addition, a cautionary
instruction from the judge might be of assistance.72

COLIN AITKEN & FRANCO TARONI, STATISTICS AND THE EVALUATION OF EVIDENCE FOR
FORENSIC SCIENTISTS 107 tbl.3.10 (2d ed. 2004) (citing IW Evett, G Jackson, JA
Lambert & S McCrossan, The Impact of the Principles of Evidence Interpretation on the
Structure and Content of Statements, 40 SCI. & JUSTICE 233, 236 (2000)).
70
See KAYE ET AL., supra note 10, § 12.5.1.
71
Bartlett’s tentatively attributes the remark to President Truman. CLIFTON
FADIMAN, & ANDRÉ BERNARD, BARTLETT’S BOOK OF ANECDOTES 542 (2000).
72
See, e.g., NRC 1996, supra note 26, at 197.
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Rarity and Numerical Testimony

Let us assume that the jury gets the message—a match
is not an absolute identification. Can the criminalist do
something more to explain its probative value? Obviously, this
depends on what is known about the frequency of the
identifying trait in the relevant population. Are the features
very common, rarely seen, or somewhere in between? There
will be occasions when such qualitative testimony is
reasonable.73 When no duplicates have been seen after
systematic, careful, and (one hopes) representative studies, a
criminalist determined to refer to uniqueness might even
assert that a trait is either unique or very rare in a population.
Numerical estimates should generally be possible, but
not necessarily from the kind of research and modeling that
Saks and Koehler describe. Fallacy suggests that forensic
scientists can devise probability models for complex patterns of
trace-evidence characteristics, sample the frequency of each
characteristic in relevant populations, verify the independence
of the characteristics, and multiply to arrive at random-match
probabilities for consumption by juries.74 This will not be easy.
Unlike nuclear DNA evidence, which both the 2009 report and
Fallacy present as a model for all of forensic science, other
patterns can be more complex, can vary substantially by locale,
or can change over time.75
Perhaps a more useful paradigm will turn out to be
mitochondrial DNA sequences. These are used in cases where
sample quantities are minute or the DNA is highly degraded.76
Mitochondrial DNA, which is found only in cytoplasm,
reproduces asexually. Therefore, it is inherited from mother to
child as a single unit.77 To give a numerical indication of the
frequency of a lineage, the FBI maintains a collection of

73

See KAYE ET AL., supra note 10, § 12.5.2. A related proposal is to describe
the strength of the evidence (the likelihood ratio) with phrases such as those listed
supra note 69. Indeed, an expert witness with adequate information could give
qualitative characterizations of both rarity and the likelihood ratio.
74
Saks & Koehler, supra note 13, at 217-18.
75
Robert D. Koons & JoAnn Buscaglia, Forensic Significance of Bullet Lead
Compositions, 50 J. FORENSIC SCI. 1 (2005); Saks & Koehler, supra note 13, at 217-18.
76
A small number of human hairs often contain enough mitochondrial DNA
for sequencing to succeed. DAVID H. KAYE, THE DOUBLE HELIX AND THE LAW OF
EVIDENCE 227-28 (2010).
77
The father merely contributes half of the nuclear DNA to the fertilized egg
cell. Id. at 215. The cytoplasm is part of the mother’s egg cell. Id.
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sequences from thousands of cases.78 It typically reports that
the matching sequence in the case at bar has not been seen in
this sample.79 For concreteness, suppose that the sample
consists of 7000 sequences. When a defendant’s sequence is not
in the database (which is the usual situation), one could say
that so far it has been encountered one out of 7001 times.80
There is ample room to argue that this number should not be
taken too seriously. It does not come from a random sample,
and it might not be representative of the population in the
vicinity of the crime.81 Still, it gives the jury some sense of how
rare the sequence is, and jurors should be able to appreciate
the limitations of the number, especially when there is
discussion of how many other people in the vicinity of the crime
might share the sequence.82
With a mitochondrial-DNA-sequence database, each
new sample is compared to all the previous ones to estimate
the match frequency, and we know how many distinct
sequences have been observed to date. Estimating the
probability of a rare event from case work is trickier, but
78

See State v. Pappas, 776 A.2d 1091, 1104, 1110 n.9 (Conn. 2001); Wagner
v. State, 864 A.2d 1037, 1045 n.9 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2005); Keith L. Monson et al., The
mtDNA Population Database: An Integrated Software and Database Resource for
Forensic Comparison, 4 FORENSIC SCI. COMMC’NS, Apr. 2002, http://www.fbi.gov/
hq/lab/fsc/backissu/april2002/miller1.htm; Deborah Polanskey & Bruce Budowle,
Summary of the Findings of a Quality Review of the Scientific Working Group on DNA
Analysis Methods Mitochondrial DNA Database, 7 FORENSIC SCI. COMMC’NS, Jan.
2005, http://www.fbi.gov/hq/lab/fsc/backissu/jan2005/research/2005research.htm.
79
See Pappas, 776 A.2d at 1104.
80
The upper confidence limit of the estimate also could be provided. The FBI
does not do this. It quotes the upper bound of a 95% confidence interval above the
proportion (0%) of the cases in which the sequence was previously seen. Id. at 1110 &
n.11 (Conn. 2001). This is the “counting method” recommended in NRC 1992, supra
note 22, at 75, to avoid any argument over the accuracy of multiplying individual
probabilities with nuclear DNA.
81
See, e.g., Frederika A. Kaestle et al., Database Limitations on the
Evidentiary Value of Forensic Mitochondrial DNA Evidence, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 53,
74-75 (2006).
82
Previous research by Koehler shows that when the expected number of
matching individuals in a population is substantial, the “pool” formulation benefits
defendants relative to the match-probability method. Jonathan J. Koehler, The
Psychology of Numbers in the Courtroom: How to Make DNA-Match Statistics Seem
Impressive or Insufficient, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 1275, 1280-81 (2001). But the “pool”
method also can lead to disputes over the size of the relevant population, see David H.
Kaye, Rounding Up the Usual Suspects: A Legal and Logical Analysis of DNA Database
Trawls, 87 N. CAR. L. REV. 425, 431 (2009) [hereinafter Trawls], and to fractional
numbers of people, which could be difficult for jurors to understand. KAYE ET AL., supra
note 10, § 12.4.1(2). When presented with both “pool” numbers and the match
frequency, mock jurors were not overwhelmed by the mitochondrial DNA evidence.
David H. Kaye et al., Statistics in the Jury Box: Do Jurors Understand Mitochondrial
DNA Match Probabilities?, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 797 (2007).
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similar reasoning applies—and shows that failing to find any
matches in a large number of comparisons of different objects
can be quite informative.83 There are various methods for
estimating the probability of an event that has occurred zero
times in a sample of n observations—the “zero-numerator”
problem.84 Applying the simplest of these, if a laboratory
documented a zero numerator in 30,000 tests, it could infer a
random-match probability of no more than 0.0001.85
Naturally, there is a risk that the jury will draw too
strong a conclusion from such a probability. This problem can
be handled by cautioning the jury against inferring uniqueness
or misconstruing the probability as a source probability. In
addition, the quality of the estimate depends on the accuracy of
the reported fraction of matching comparisons, the conditions
under which the matches were made, and the analogy between
a random sample and the casework or research sample.
C.

Source Testimony

Experts in other fields routinely provide categorical
statements. Pathologists opine as to the manner of death,
psychologists to competence, and engineers to the cause of
product failures. The law of evidence generally allows expert
opinion testimony when it is well founded, but under normal
relevance rules, existing theory and data on the discernible
uniqueness of trace evidence typically are too weak to justify
admission of an opinion that a pattern is unique.86 Contrary to
83

In assessing the probative value of a match, the sensitivity needs to be
considered as well: How often do matches arise when the objects being compared are
one and the same? See, e.g., V.L. Phillips et al., The Application of Signal Detection
Theory to Decision-making in Forensic Science, 46 J. FORENSIC SCI. 294 (2001).
84
E.g., J.A. Hanley & A. Lipp-Hand, If Nothing Goes Wrong, Is Everything
All Right? Interpreting Zero Numerators, 249 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1743, 1743 (1983);
Thomas A. Louis, Confidence Intervals for a Binomial Parameter After Observing No
Successes, 35 AM. STAT., 154, 154 (1981); Allan R. Sampson & Robert L. Smith,
Assessing Risks Through the Determination of Rare Event Probabilities, 30 OPERATIONS
RES. 839, 840-41 (1982); Robert L. Winkler et al., The Role of Informative Priors in
Zero-Numerator Problems: Being Conservative Versus Being Candid, 56 AM.
STATISTICIAN 1, 1 (2002).
85
This estimate uses 3/n as an approximate upper bound on the probability.
B. D. Jovanovic & P. S. Levy, A Look at the Rule of Three, AM. STATISTICIAN, May 1997,
at 137. The “counting method” proposed for DNA typing, with a confidence coefficient
of 0.95, see supra note 80, is equivalent to this simple rule.
86
An expert might still be justified in reporting the reasons for thinking that
the match is probative of identity. Statements such as “In my experience, different
guns always give rise to different striations on the bullets” could be used in lieu of more
precise studies, but unless the expert has meaningful experience in studying
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recent federal district court opinions, experts should not be
permitted to avoid the limitations in their knowledge simply by
qualifying assertions of uniqueness with a fig leaf such as “to a
reasonable degree of ballistic certainty.”87
But what if the record were stronger? As long as there is
a nonzero probability of duplication or another swan to
consider—as there always will be—such testimony apparently
fails Fallacy’s exacting standard for statistical proof. As we
have seen, however, this austere standard does not comport
with normal scientific practice. In the DNA field, scientists
have indicated that opinions of general uniqueness88 or
uniqueness of a particular DNA type within some smaller
region89 are or will soon become scientifically acceptable.90
To be sure, there is disagreement over how and whether
to ascertain a precise value of a probability of uniqueness,91 and
mismatches for guns that did not actually produce the striations, undocumented
references to “experience” may reveal more about the analyst’s state of mind than they
do about the state of the world. When testimony is of the “I know it, but neither I nor
anyone else has studied it systematically” variety, a strong argument can be made that
juries will overvalue the testimony and that exclusion is appropriate to encourage more
extensive research.
87
United States v. Monteiro, 407 F. Supp. 2d 351, 375 (D. Mass. 2006)
(holding that “the expert may testify that the cartridge cases were fired from a
particular firearm to a reasonable degree of ballistic certainty” even though the
accuracy of these judgments is unclear and “the expert may not testify that there is a
match to an exact statistical certainty”); see also United States v. Mouzone, No. WDQ08-086, 2009 WL 3617748, at *19-20 (D. Md. Oct. 29, 2009) (recommendations in
magistrate’s report); United States v. Taylor, 663 F.Supp.2d 1170 (D.N.M. 2009);
United States v. Diaz, No. CR 05-00167 WHA, 2007 WL 485967, at *14 (N.D. Cal. Feb.
12, 2007) (firearms toolmarks identification is admissible under Daubert, but “[t]he
experts may not . . . testify to their conclusions ‘to the exclusion of all other firearms in
the world.’ They may only testify that a particular bullet or cartridge case was fired
from a particular firearm to a ‘reasonable degree of certainty in the ballistics field.’”).
88
See NRC 1996, supra note 26; NRC 1992, supra note 22; DANIEL L. HARTL
& ANDREW G. CLARK, PRINCIPLES OF POPULATION GENETICS 131 (3d ed. 1997)
(“Matches at 7 to 9 [VNTR] loci are virtually definitive of identity—barring technical
errors in the DNA typing itself (such as mislabeling of blood samples) and except for
identical twins.”); B.S. Weir, Discussion of “Inference in Forensic Identification”, 158 J.
ROYAL STAT. SOC’Y A 49 (1995) (“[T]he chance that two unrelated individuals in a
population share the same 16-allele [VNTR] profile is vanishingly small, and even for
full sibs the chance is only 1 in very many thousands.”).
89
Bruce Budowle et al., Source Attribution of a Forensic DNA Profile, FORENSIC
SCI. COMMC’NS, July 2000, http://www.fbi.gov/hq/lab/fsc/backissu/july2000/source.htm.
90
After reviewing this literature, one court agreed that “when a DNA method
analyzes genetic markers at sufficient locations to arrive at an infinitesimal random
match probability, expert opinion testimony of a match and of the source of the DNA
evidence is admissible.” Young v. State, 879 A.2d 44, 45 (Md. 2005).
91
See David J. Balding, When Can a DNA Profile Be Regarded as Unique?,
39 SCI. & JUSTICE 257, 257 (1999) (“The probability that a defendant’s DNA profile is
unique in a population of untyped individuals is . . . bounded below by one minus twice
the sum of the match probabilities over the population . . . . However, because of the
problem of the non-DNA evidence, there seems to be no satisfactory way for an expert
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no canon of scientific reasoning demands that experts focus
directly on the question of uniqueness.92 DNA experts can
continue with the present regime of giving the incredibly small
random-match probabilities that imply uniqueness. They can
multiply these numbers by some arbitrary population size and
report that in the “pool,” some number of people (even a
fractional number) would be expected to have the defendant’s
genotype. But the numbers could be a hair’s breadth away from
the statement that no unrelated person would be expected to
share this profile. Why not, as one astute statistician asks, give
“a ‘plain English’ statement . . . ? For example, perhaps an
expert witness could assert that, excluding identical twins and
laboratory/handling errors, in his/her opinion the defendant’s
witness to address the question of uniqueness in court.”); Bruce Weir, Are DNA Profiles
Unique?, PROCEEDINGS OF THE NINTH INT’L SYMPOSIUM ON HUMAN IDENTIFICATION
114, 116 (1998), available at http://www.promega.com/geneticidproc/ussymp9proc/ (“It
is very difficult to arrive at a satisfactory probabilistic or statistical genetic theory
which will give the probability that a second person in a population has the same DNA
profile as the one featuring in a criminal trial” because of “possible dependencies
between loci and between individuals.”). But see BALDING, supra note 34, at 138 (“A
calculation of the probability of ‘uniqueness’ may also provide useful information for
courts, proved that a satisfactory way is found to explain the underlying
assumptions.”).
92
Cf. Saks & Koehler, supra note 13, at 218 n.94 (“[O]ffering source
identifications at trial for sufficiently low probabilities would not be an implication of
the science . . . .”). A scientific working group of the National Commission on the
Future of DNA Evidence expressed the idea as follows:
The statistical basis for individualization is discussed by Evett and Weir
(1998, pp. 243-244). The concept of individualization has been supported by
Balding (1999). The FBI procedure has been criticized by Weir (1999) and
supported by Budowle, Chakraborty, et al. (2000). Whether this, or in fact
any statistical procedure for defining individualization is defensible continues
to be debated. The procedure provides one way to interpret discriminatory
power (a scientific question) in terms of “a reasonable degree of scientific
certainty” (a subjective question). It is quite possible that within 5 years or
less some such criterion will be accepted by the legal and forensic community,
not as a scientifically appropriate statement, but as a practical definition for
forensic purposes.
NAT’L COMM’N ON THE FUTURE OF DNA EVIDENCE, RESEARCH & DEV. WORKING GROUP,
THE FUTURE OF FORENSIC DNA TESTING: PREDICTIONS OF THE RESEARCH AND
DEVELOPMENT WORKING GROUP 25-26 (2000). The committee was explaining that
there is no strictly scientific criterion for deciding how small the random-match
probability must be to warrant an opinion that a particular genotype is “effectively
unique.” It stated that:
Eventually, the probability becomes so small that the profile is effectively
unique. The basis for concern would then be whether the techniques are
adequate, the chain of custody is intact, the statistical treatment is
appropriate, and no errors were made. But how small must such a probability
be for a profile to be individualized?
Id.
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DNA profile is almost certainly unique in some appropriate
population.”93
Still other modes of presentation have been proposed.94
My objective is not to argue for any one of them, but only to ask
that the issue be decided by examining the ease of
presentation, comprehensibility, and scientific defensibility of
all of them.
CONCLUSION
Radical skepticism of all possible assertions of
uniqueness is not justified. Absolute certainty (in the sense of
zero probability of a future contradicting observation) is
unattainable in any science. But this fact does not make
otherwise well-founded opinions unscientific or inadmissible.
Furthermore, whether or not global uniqueness is
demonstrable, there are circumstances in which an analyst can
testify to scientific knowledge of the likely source of an object or
impression. The admissibility of particular source attributions
thus should turn on the actual state of this knowledge as
applied to the task at hand, and to the helpfulness to the judge
or jury of this testimony as contrasted with alternative
presentations of forensically valuable findings. The optimal
format for explaining the logical impact of a match is not selfevident. But it is clear that if forensic scientists are to
contribute fully to the just resolution of criminal cases, they
need a less absolutist and more nuanced theory of
identification
than
the
traditional
presumption
of
characteristics
that
are
intuitively
judged
to
be
individualizing.95 This is a fundamental—and fundamentally
sound—message of the National Academy and of the broader
academy.

93

BALDING, supra note 34, at 136. In “the minority of cases in which
uniqueness cannot reasonably be asserted,” Balding proposes “a probability of
uniqueness.” Id. But see supra note 91. A rough probability for uniqueness among
unrelated individuals of the particular genotype in question could be provided in all
cases. See KAYE ET AL., supra note 10, § 12.4.1(2).
94
See, e.g., KAYE ET AL., supra note 10, § 12; Trawls, supra note 81.
95
See, e.g., Christophe Champod & Ian W. Evett, A Probabilistic Approach to
Fingerprint Evidence, 51 J. FORENSIC IDENTIFICATION 101 (2001); Saks & Kohler,
supra note 13.

